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Behavioral Sciences and the Law, Vol. 9, 111-128 (1991) 
Power Imbalances .in 
Therapeutic and Forensic 
Relationships 
Michael L. Perlin, J.D. 
This article examines the ways that power imbalances 
affect relationships in the forensic mental disability system 
and between therapists and their clients. It considers the 
impact of the "dual loyalty" dilemma on forensic relation-
ships, the manner in which courts deal with this dilemma, 
and suggests several points of commonality that arise 
aJ;"ound such power conflicts. It also examines recent litiga-
tion involving therapeutic relationships, and attempts to 
extract doctrinal threads from these cases. Finally, it 
recommends that, in order for the judicial system to 
attempt to correct any of the underlying imbalances, courts 
and jurors must openly come to grips with the psy~ho-
dynamic issues that underlie these imbalances. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
l'he legal system is, at its base, about the allocation of power, 
1 
and the existence 
of power relationships: relationships between the state and individuals, 2 between 
the federal government and the states,3 and between the legislature and the judici-
ary, 4 Almost every significant Supreme Court case involves questions dealing with 
Power relationships, with the distribution of power and the limits of power. Consider 
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I 
12:;e ~rgume~t is made most powerfully in Cover, Violen_ce and the Wo~d, 95 Y".1-E L. J. 1601 (1986). 
O99
e;)~ work 1s carefully considered in Sherwin, Law, Violence, and Illiberal B elief, 78 GEO. L.J. 1785 
Ii The issue is discussed in, inter alia, Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 514 (1969) (power of 
cfuse of Representatives to exclude member); Atkins v. United States, 556 F .2d 1028, 1067 (Ct. 
13 · .1977), cert. den., 434 U.S. 1009 (1978) (justiciability of case involving federal judge pay scale) · 
in:~k v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 307 A.2d 571, 594 (1973), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1106 (1973) (rule~ 
reh' ng power of state Supreme Court); People v. Kaedin~, 98 ~ll.2d 237, 456 N .E.2d 11, 17 (1983), 
Ill g den._ (1983) (allocation of treatment power in cases mvolvmg defendants adjudicated "guilty but 
F:;tally 111"). On the manner in which jurisdictional decisions reflect power allocations, see M. REDISH, 
' Se E~ JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN 1HE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER (1980) . 
, e 1nfra notes 8-9 s . . 
• See 1_nfra notes 7, 12. 
ee 1nfra note 11 . 
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variously the power of a President to seize a company's steel mill at a time of national 
emergency,5 the power of the federal courts to force states to desegregate their 
school systems or private business enterprises to desegregate their public facilities, 
6 
the power of the federal courts to deprive state prosecutors of the ability to use 
evidence against a criminal suspect that was obtained by methods that violated 
the Constitution, 7 the power of a state to interfere with a woman's right to repro-
ductive autonomy8 or a couple's right to practice consensual sodomy in their 
home,9 the power of a President to shield certain documents from public view,1° 
the power of the federal courts to order state legislatures to reapportion, 11 or the 
power of the states to impose the death penalty. 12 
In other less well-known contexts, courts and scholars have begun to critically 
examine the existence of inherent imbalances of power in certain other relationships; 
for instance, the relationship between a franchise dealer and a manufacturer, 
13 
between an employer and an employee, 14 between sexual offenders and child vic-
tims, 15 between students and university administrators, 16 between attorneys and 
clients,17 between clergy and penitents, 18 and between criminal defendants and 
the prosecution. 19 Others have expanded this inquiry to consider the imbalances 
in any cross-gender relationships, 20 or, even, in the full range of all relationships 
that exist in "social reality. " 21 Often, power imbalance issues emerge most pointedly 
in those cases where one party is dependent on the other through underlying pro-
fessional, personal or social associations. 22 
For the purposes of this article, I wish to focus specifically on power imbalance 
issues that flow from three specific kinds of cases: (1) the institutionalization of 
putatively mentally ill individuals, (2) the trial of mentally disabled criminal defen-
dants, and (3) the legal regulation of mental health practice. While scholars variously 
couch their discussion of these cases in such terms as balancing the police power 
with due process, or police power with parens patriae interests, or professional au ton-
' Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
6 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 
379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
7 Miranda v. Arizona, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
8 Roev. Wade,410U.S. 113 (1973) . -
9 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
10 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
11 Bakerv. Carr, 369 U .S. 186 (1962). 
12 Compare Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (unconstitutionality of death penalty), to Gregg 
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding constitutionality of death penalty statutes). 
13 Monmouth Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 102 N .J. 485, 509 A.2d 161 (1986). 
14 Rudow v. NYC Commission on Human Rights, 123 Misc.2d 709, 474 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sup. Ct. 
1984); General Drivers, Helpers & Truck Terminal Employees v. City of St. Paul, 270 N.W.2d 877 
(Minn. 1978). 
15 Mindlin, Child Sexual Abuse and Criminal Statutes of Limitation: A Model for Reform, 65 WASH. L. 
REV. 189 (1991) . 
16 Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989). 
17 In re Littleton, 719 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. 1986). 
18 State v. Dunon, 450 N.W.2d 189 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
19 Resnik, The Federal Rules in Practice: The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2219 (1989) . 
20 Bender, Gender Equality in the Legal Profession: Sex Discrimination or Gender Inequality, 57 FORD. L. 
REv. 941 (1989). 
21 West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641 (1990). 
22 Coleman, Sex in Power Dependency Relationships: Taking Unfair Advantage of the "Fair Sex," 53 ALB· 
L. REV. 95, 96 (1988). 
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omy with personal privacy rights, paring the competing values to their core reveals 
that these cases all reflect allocations of power. 
Power allocations in these three general areas may manifest themselves in a myriad 
of concrete situations. For example, there are allocations between a committing 
agency and an individual who wishes to resist commitment, 23 or between a state 
department of mental health and an institutionalized individual seeking either to 
vindicate her right to treatment or to interpose her right to refuse treatment, 24 
or between a prosecutor seeking to make use of a statement admitting to guilt by 
a mentally disabled defendant who wishes to resist its introduction into evidence 
(in that it does not reflect the product of a "free will") and that defendant, 25 or 
between a forensic mental health professional wishing to testify as to a defendant's 
"future dangerousness" (thus making him amenable to capital punishment in certain 
iurisdictions) and the resisting defendant, 26 or between a tort plaintiff charging 
her therapist with sexual manipulation and the therapist arguing that the patient's 
claims are nothing more than misplaced transference, 27 or between an assault victim 
alleging that a therapist should have somehow prevented the assault and the perpetra-
tor's therapist arguing that principles of confidentiality "trump" any duty to warn 
or protect. 28 
And yet, we tend to view these cases from very different perspectives. We character-
ize them as involving questions of professional autonomy, "turf' issues, public safety 
considerations and matters of competing fundamental constitutional interests. What 
We seem to skip over is how all of these cases involve questions of power. In some 
instances, they involve the power that a state can exert over a mentally disabled 
'.' See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972). The underlying issues are considered 
\? this context in Bagby, The Deprofessiortalization of Civil Commitment, 29 CAN• PSYCHOLOGIST 234 (1988). 
See Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). (right to treatment); Youngberg v. Romeo, 
457 U.S. 307 (1982) (right to freedom from bodily harm); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 
1983) (right of civil patients to refuse treatment); Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990) (right 
gfprisoner to refuse treatment) . 
26 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U .S. 157 (1986). 
27 See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). 
,, See Landau v. Werner, 105 Sol. J. 1008 (C.A. 1961). 
See Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal.3d 425, 551- P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 
14 Cl 976) . 
. In this context, the word "trump" is used to denote the supremacy of one right or duty over another 
~ght or duty. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'! Planning Agency, 911 
·2d 1331, 1347 (9th Cir. l 990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting in part): 
The fact is, the Constitution protects a variety of rights and liberties and reasonable minds 
might differ as to the relative importance of each. When we relegate certain of these to collateral 
status by refusing to give them the full measure of constitutional protection, we undermine 
the integrity of the constitutional structure and hand a potent weapon to those who may 
S not share our vision al to which rights trump which. 
,~e also Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 3: The Place of Liberty, 73 IOWA L. REv. l, 13 n.11 (1987) 
( a Utilitarian political morality could not recognize a general right to liberty as a trump over utilitarian 
~lcu!ations of overall social advantage"). The principle is applied in, inter alia, IRS v. Federal Labor 
Mla~ons Authority, 110 S. Ct. 1623, 1627 (1990) (labor-management grievances); Lamb v. Phillip 
.
0~s, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1029 n . 12 (6th Cir. 1990) (legislative history analysis); West-Texas Trans-
~ss~on, L.P. v. Enron Corp., 907 F.2d 1554, 1559 (5th Cir. 1990) (gas pipeline repurchase) Walker 
p' <;:ity of Kansas City, Mo., 911 F.2d 80, 95 (8th Cir. 1 ~9?) (ordinance regulating "go-go" bars); 
l e;tt, The "Rule of Reason" in AntitruSt Law: Praperty Logic in Restraint of Competition, 40 HASTINGS 
· · 285 (1989) (antitrust implications of railroad stock purchase). 
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individual, but they also involve the question of the exertion of power by a mental 
health professional over a mentally disabled individual. 
The fact that these issues involve power allocations is enormously important. 
What is perhaps even more important is the fact that the whole question of power- of 
power balances and imbalances, of the use and exploitation of power, of the inevitabi-
lity of power relationships- is so underdiscussed and underconsidered in this particu-
lar context. If Jonas Robitscher was correct when he argued a decade ago that the 
psychiatrist is the "most important nongovernmental decisionmaker in modern 
life,"29 and if Alfred Adler was correct when he argued that the drive for power 
was the single most important factor in determining man's behavior,30 mental health 
professionals and the public at large both have to reflect on the special irony we 
face here. While we professionally understand fully the importance of power, while 
we politically know that mental health professionals have the capacity to exert tremen-
dous power, and while we legally see that so many of the questions with which 
we deal in this area are bottomed on allocations of power, the basic power questions 
that pervade all of these relationships are still rarely explored.31 
I will attempt to consider these questions in the following manner. In the section 
on ForeO:sic Relationships, I will look at power balances and imbalances that are 
peculiar to the forensic relationship, adopting, for these purposes, Paul Appelbaum's 
limiting definition, construing such forensic relationships to apply to interactions 
the purpose of which "is to convey information to one or. more third parties concern-
ing the subject of the evaluation. " 32 I will consider briefly the dilemmas of "dual 
loyalties" first articulated 16 years ago by Jerome Shestack,33 the way some of 
the conflicts are treated by the courts, and the way some thoughtful forensic mental 
health professionals have suggested that the underlying problems can be dealt with. 
In the section on Therapeutic Relationships, I will look at both global and specific 
power imbalances that stem from the therapeutic relationship. In conclusion, I will 
examine judicial attitudes towards the underlying issues, in an effort to try to deter-
mine whether there is any sort of doctrinal coherence to this whole area, explain 
the types of reasoning processes that seem to- animate judicial decisionmakers here, 
and predict expected future developments. 
29 
See J. ROBITSCHER, THE POWERS OF PSYCHIATRY 8 ( 1980). See also Brodsky, Ethical Issues For Psychologists 
in Corrections, in WHO IS THE CLIENf? THE ETHICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INrERVENfION INfO THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 63, 74 (J. Monahan ed. 1980) (discussing potential for abuse in "the considerable 
power that exists in psychology for controlling and shaping individuals' behavior"). 
30 
A. ADLER, THE PRACTICE AND THEORY OF INDMDUAL PSYCHOLOGY 209 (A. Radin trans. 1951), as 
quoted in S. HALLECK, THE POLITICS OF THERAPY 261 (1971). 
~• Fo~ instan~e, in neither of two of the most important contemporary psychiatric works on ethical issues 
m this field 1s there even a subject matter listing in the index for "power" or "coercion." See LAW 
AND ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY (C. Hofling ed. 1981); A. DYER, ETHICS AND PSYCHIATRY: 
TOWARD PROFESSIONAL DEFINIJ'ION (1985). Only one reference is made in Dyer's book to "double 
agentry." A. DYER, supra, at 6&-69. See infra text accompanying notes 45-46. A WESTI.A W® computer 
search ~conduct_ed on November 15, 1990) revealed only one civil case litigated in the last decade that 
deals directly with the underlying questions: an opinion that considered whether a state hospital could 
ban a parent from speaking to his institutionalized daughter where the facility's doctors believed that 
such communication conflicted with the therapy being employed. See Doe v. Public Health Trust of 
Dade County, 696 F.2d 901 (11th Cir. 1983), holding that the hospital's non-communication policy 
"trumped" the parent's right to communicate with his child. 
:: Appelbaum, Corlfidentiality in the Forensic evaluation, 7 Im'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 285, 289 (1984). 
See Shestack, Psychiatry and the Dilemmas of Dual Loyalties, 60 A.B.A. J. 1521 (1974). 
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II. FORENSIC RELATIONSHIPS 
The most modest deconstruction34 of the phrase "forensic relationship" reveals 
the presenting dilemma: by its very nature, the "forensic relationship" is an unba-
lanced one. The forensic mental health professional is not, after all, "seeing a patient" 
for therapeutic purpose. Instead, she is intervening on behalf of the litigation, econ-
omic or administrative needs of one of a series of third parties-an attorney, the 
court, a prosecuting agency, a state mental health facility, an insurance company, 
an army. But for these external actors, the forensic relationship would not-could 
not-exist. 35 There can be no pretense, for instance, (1) that absolute confidentiality 
applies at the forensic interview,36 or (2) that the mental health professional is 
Present to provide treatment. 37 · 
Having said that, however, the inquiry into these two distinctions cannot come 
to an end. The mere fact that absolute confidentiality does not apply does not end 
consideration of that question; it is necessary for the evaluator to realize that the 
subject might still have legitimate expectations of confidentiality beyond what must 
~e disclosed as within the material scope of the evaluation, 38 and that the subject 
is entitled to be informed of the level of confidentiality that will apply in the forensic 
relationship. 39 Beyond the threshold question of whether the interviewee is compe-
tent to give informed consent to a clinical assessment, 40 collateral confidentiality 
questions must also be weighed by the evaluator: has the interviewee consented 
to the evaluation (in those instances where concepts of informed consent apply)?41 
!"Ias the interviewer considered whether she has an obligation of reciprocity (that 
is, should she, can she, must she) _tell the interviewee about information that she 
?as gleaned from third parties?42 Answers to these dilemmas are rarely spelled out 
in case law or in statutes, and it is important that the forensic evaluator realize 
that she may have to answer them. 
This relationship may still contain therapeutic content. If the legal relationship 
,, 
Se~ have recen_tly tried other similarly modest deconstructions in ?th~r ar~as_ of mental disability l~w. 
S ' e.g., Perlin, Are Courts Competent to Decide Competency Questions. Stnppmg the Facade from United 
dates v. Charters, 38 U. KAN. L . REV. 957, 967-68 (1990) (deconstructing "competency"); Perlin, 
t'"Petency, !Jeinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A ~tory of Marginaliz~tion, 28 ~ous. L. REv. 63 ~!9.1) (Perlm, Competency) (same); M . Perlin, "Morality a~~ Pre~extuality,,,Psychiatry ~nd Law: Of 
19 dinary Common Sense,' Heuristic Reasoning, and Cogmttve Dissonance (paper delivered to the 
• 9o annual conference of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law) ( deconstructing "pretextuality" 
!~ :e~tal disability law and litigation). 
CluAeiner, Ethical Issues in Forensic Psychiatry: From an Attorney's Perspective, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. Psv-
,, I\ TRY & L. 253, 254 (1984). . . . 
of .J>Pelbau~, s~ta note ?2, a_t 287-90. In a rela~ed vem,_ H~rbert Modlm _p?mts out that th<; exercise 
fre self-scrun~y 1s especially important to forensic p_sychiarr:ists, whose opm1o_ns and conclus1ons "are 
Ps quentiy subiect to public scrutiny." Modlin, Forensic Psychiatry and Malpractice, 18 BULL. AM. ACAD. 
37:~IATRY&L. 153,162 (1990). 
"I\ einer, supra note 35, at 253-54. 
,, I?. Ppelbaum, supra note 32, at 289-90. 
su epon of the Task Force on the Role of Psychology in the Criminal Justice System, in J. Monahan, ed., 
a;f';a note 29, at 1, 5. Monahan's inquiry is considered carefully in Lyon & Levine, Ethics, Power, 
"'R..:dvocacy:_ Psyc~ology in the CriminalJustic~ System, 6 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 65 (1982). 
<t S gers, Ethical Dilemmas in Forensic Evaluations, 5 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 149, 154 (1987). 
"R..:J, Monahan, supra note 29, at 6-7. . . . . . 
1'he gers! supra note 40, at 155-56. On the 1mplicat1ons of Tarasojffor forensic relattonships, see Note, 
A.pP!ication of the Tarasojf Duty to Forensic Psychiatry, 66 VA. L. REv. 715 (1980). 
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and the due process hearing have a therapeutic content, 43 it would be unseemly to 
suggest that contact with an evaluating mental health professional is definitionally 
devoid of such content. The fact that there may be some therapeutic content "raises 
the ante" as to force an assessment of whether the presence of this content may be 
inherently meretricious. Regardless, the potentiality of this pr~sence cannot obscure 
some of the fundamental characteristics that are unique to the forensic relationship. 
Indeed, given the omnipresence of a third party, it is necessary to begin with 
the proposition that, definitionally, any forensic relationship contains a power imbal-
ance, because of the pervasive dangers of "dual loyalties, " 44 or, more provocatively, 
of "double agentry. " 45 While the dangers stemming from this dual role may be 
different in differing circumstances (depending in large part on the motives of the 
forensic mental health professional's employer), the question to be asked is the same 
one first asked by Shestack: 
Can the psychiatrist be both the agent of the patient and of the institution that 
employs him? [W]hom is the psychiatrist supposed to represent?46 
Again, we can identify a plethora of conflict-laden situations:47 
-a doctor employed by a public hospital interviewing an individual who faces 
civil commitment or an NGRI acquittee who is petitioning for release; 
-a court clinic mental health professional examining defendants prior to the 
imposition of sentence; 
-a psychiatrist on contract to an insurance company examining beneficiaries 
who allege psychic stress or trauma; 
-a school district mental health professional who evaluates a "problem" student 
to determine whether suspension or expulsion or transfer is the appropriate disposi-
tion; 
43 See, e.g., Perlin, An Invitation to the Dance: An Empirical Response to Chief Justice Wa,ren Burger's 
"Time-Consuming Procedural Minuets" Theory in Parham v. J.R., 9 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY ~ 
L. 149 (1976). Legal scholars are now beginning to critically investigate the question of how seriously 
(if at all) legal rules impair the functioning of the mental health system. See, e.g., Schopp & Wexler, 
Shooting Yourself in the Foot With Due Care, 17 J . PSYCHIATRY & L. (1989); THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: 
THE LAw AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (D. Wexler ed. 1990). For a recent listing of the relevant literature, 
see Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction Between Assent and Objection, 28 Hous . 
. ~- REv. n. 150 (1991). 
Shestack, supra note 33, at 1521 . 
45 Halleck, The Ethical Dilemmas of Forensic Psychiatry: A Utilitarian Approach, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSY-
CHIATRY & L. 279, 279 (1984). 
The most pointed judicial exchange on this issue is found in United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.), on the question of the admissibility of statements made by a defendant 
to a court-appointed psychiatrist tending to negate his insanity defense. Compare id. at 1115 (no violation 
of defendant's right against self-incrimination when defendant raised insanity defense), to id. at 1152-53 
(Bazelon, J., dissenting): 
The government psychiatrist is armed with the same technical expertise as the private psychiatrist. 
He is trained to gain the confidence of a patient. As a medical doctor, the psychiatrist is conceived 
of as a healer, a participant in a voluntary therapeutic alliance directed to the patient's benefit. 
Unlike the policeman, whose goals and methods engender wariness in the defendant, the govern-
ment psychiatrist in the state hospital engenders trust. But this trust is unwarranted. The psychia-
trist's aim is diagnosis, not therapy. His primary commitment is to his institution, not to his 
patient. Given these concerns, I must conclude that the court-ordered psychiatrist examination 
poses a threat of coercion similar to that in the interrogation deemed unconstitutional in Miranda. 
(footnotes omitted). 
46 Shestack, suprp note 33, at 1521. 
47 See generally Halleck, supra note 45, at 280. 
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-the army psychiatrist examining a "troublemaker" soldier who faces a "Section 
8" discharge; 
-the private hospital doctor in a for-profit facility being pressured to maintain 
census levels; 
-a forensic witness evaluating defendants for purposes of sentencing in potential 
death penalty cases (or, perhaps, testifying on the basis of hypotheticals in such 
matters), for purposes of evaluating competency to stand trial, or for purposes 
of evaluating criminal responsibility; 
-a prison psychiatrist weighing a prisoner's right to refuse the imposition of psy-
chotropic medication; or even, 
-an examining witness retained by an attorney for a civil plaintiff or a criminal 
defendant whose opinion is sought either as to a question of competency, or 
as to the question of the presence of damages in a "psychiatric tort" case, or 
as to the viability of a mental status defense. 
All of these disparate situations include some important points in common. First, 
there is a multiplicity of interests being represented. Beyond the potentially conflict-
ing interests of the forensic mental health professional's employer, and the additional 
set of variables to be considered in weighing the specific ethical proscriptions for 
lawyers dealing with forensic experts, 48 the forensic evaluator may also weigh-
consciously or unconsciously-community, social and political values (for example, 
in determining whether a notorious insanity acquittee should be given conditional 
release),49 or the availability of public hospital space or potential fear of liability 
in weighing the need for involuntary civil commitment. 
50 
Ben Bursten sees the 
Problem even more broadly. In his view, any decision as to whether any behavior 
is a product of mental illness is not a matter of scientific expertise, "but a matter 
of social policy. " 51 
This was conceded in a report done by an NIMH advisory committee in the 
Wake of the Hinckley acquittal, acknowledging that, "in controversial cases," the 
government "can be counted upon to oppose any conditional release recommenda-
tion. " 52 In the civil context, we are now also beginning to consider seriously how 
Patients' families feel about civil commitment; since early empirical surveys show 
that relatives now dramatically fav~r longer terms of commitment and less restrictive 
commitment standards and that they specifically express the need for the "assignment 
of a professional" to aid them in coping with their family member's commitment 
Procedures, 53 it is likely that this additional, potentially conflicting interest will 
also raise questions of further forensic imbalances. 
Second, it is possible that the individual at risk may suffer harm as a result of 
his participation in the evaluation process. This is most pointed in the situation 
48 See Fitch, Petrella & Wallace, Legal Ethics and the Use of Mental Health Experts in Criminal Cases, 
?. BEHAVIORAL SCI. &L. 105, 109-16 (1987) . 
,
0 
See Shestack, supra note 33, at 1522. 
Thompson & Ager, An Experimental Analysis of the Civil Commitment Recommendations of Psychologists 
~nd Psychiatrists, 6 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 1 i 9, 120 (1988). 
52 
B. BURSTEN, BEYOND PSYCHIATRIC EXPERTISE 167 (1984). 
~erlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE WES. 
H. · L. ~- 59_9, 671 (1989-90), quoting Final Report of the National Institute of Mental Health Ad 
53 
oc Forensic Advisory Panel, 12 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DIS~ILITY L. ~P. 7?, _96 (1988) (emphasis added). 
McFarland, Faulkner, Bloom, Hallaux & Bray, Family Members Opinions About Civil Commitment 
41 Hosp_ & COMMUNITY PsYCHIATRY 537,539 (1990). ' 
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where a forensic expert evaluates a defendant to determine whether he is competent 
to be executed,54 and it is in this context that forensic professionals have begun 
to debate whether they should be involved at all in the underlying process. 55 How-
ever, the potential for harm (albeit, lesser harm) to the subject in virtually every 
other forensic context should also be clear. 
Third, some of the harm that may befall the patient may flow directly from the 
mental health professional's employment of skills designed to help individuals (and 
thus the earlier caveat as to how the interaction's "therepeutic content" may "raise 
the ante" for the patients). As Dr. Seymour Halleck has asked: "Is it morally justified 
to use skills originally developed for the sole purpose of helping patients in order 
to derive information that ultimately may be used to hurt them?"56 During the 
data-gathering process, the mental health professional may thus use his empathic 
skills to "seduce the subject into revealing deleterious information" he might not 
otherwise reveal. 57 
Fourth, unless the mental health professional acknowledges (consciously and 
openly) the existence of this potentially tainted relationship, it is likely that power 
imbalances will tilt even further to the institutional side. As an example, the recent 
United States Supreme Court case of Buchanan v. Kentucky58 allowed a prosecutor 
to rebut an "extreme emotional disturbance" defense by using the contents of a 
report prepared as part of a determination as to whether a pre-trial detainee was 
eligible for transfer to a hospital setting so as to be psychiatrically treated. Use 
of the report was sanctioned, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant had not 
been informed that data he gave to evaluators in determining his amenability to 
treatment might be used against him in the prosecution of the underlying homicide 
case. 59 Again, if the subject is not informed fully of the imbalance in the "relation-
ship" with the forensic examiner, decisions such as Buchanan will be inevitable. 
Fifth, there exists an "identification bias" through which, as a result of a witness's 
unconscious identification with one "side" of a legal battle or his more conscious 
identification with a particular value system or set of ideological leanings, his "secret 
hope for victory for his own opinion [may lead to] innumerable subtle distortions 
54 
Compare Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U .S. 399 (1986) (execution of a mentally ill prisoner violates the 
Eighth Amendment), to Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989) (Eighth Amendment does notrequire 
blanket ban proscribing execution of mentally retarded prisoners) . See also Perry v. Louisiana, 111 S. 
Ct. 449 (1990), which vacated and remanded the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision allowing the 
State to administer antipsychotic medication to a death row inmate so as to make him competent to 
be executed, in light of the Court's decision in Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990) (articulating 
limits on right of prisoners to refuse antipsychotic medication) . See generally 3 M. PERLIN, MENTAL 
DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL §§17.02-17.06 (1989) & §l 7.06A (1990 pocket part). 
" Compare Bonnie, Dilemmas in Administering the Death Penalty: Conscientious Abstention, Professional 
Ethics, and the Needs of the Legal System, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 67 (1990), to Brodsky, Professional 
Ethics and Professional Morality in the Assessment of Competence for Execution, _ 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
91 (1990), to Bonnie, Grounds for Professional Abstention in Capital Cases: A Reply to Brodsky, 14 LAW 
&HUM. BEHAV. 99 (1990). 
56 Halleck, supra note 45, at 280. 
" Appelbaum, Psychiatric Ethics in the Courtroom, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 225,229 (1984) . 
58 107 S. Ct. 2906 (1987) . 
59 The relationship berween Buchanan and Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (applying Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments to uncounseled pretrial psychiatric examination in case where insanity def ense_ was 
not raised) is explored in 3 M. PERLIN, supra note 54, §16.04A, at 425-29, 434-35, and in Perlin, 
Admissibility of Psychiatric Evaluations Under Miranda and the Right to Counsel: Satterwhite and Buchanan, 
15 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 73 (1988). 
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and biases in his testimony that spring from this wish to triumph. " 60 As a result, 
we find a positive influence of political ideology in forensic examiners' assessments 
of insanity defense claims61 and of civil psychic trauma allegations, 62 an influence 
that has to be considered in light of the possibility that, in a whole variety of fact-
settings, social bias frequently "infects and hides behind scientific judgments. " 63 
Recently, for instance, a research study revealed that a patient's sex, color and sexual 
orientation may control, to a significant degree, whether a physician decides to breach 
confidentiality and reveal that a patient carries the AIDS virus. 64 The problem 
here is heightened when we consider the evidence that (1) many forensic experts 
misunderstand the basic relevant standards for such legal constructs as "insanity" 
or "incompetency to stand trial,"65 and (2) that legal and social service agencies 
are often unclear as to the express purpose for which the evaluation was sought 
in the first place. 66 
Sixth, there may be economic issues to consider as well. There is already some 
evidence that the recent dramatic increase in for-profit private psychiatric hospitals 
under corporate ownership has led to an increased number of children admitted 
to such facilities at a time when some physicians are under pressure to maintain 
a maximal census and thus increase profits. 67 The potential that this pressure can 
distort forensic evaluations on questions of hospital admissions and releases is yet 
another power imbalance that we need to confront. 
Seventh, we must consider recent evidence demonstrating that, in response to 
legislative actions tightening involuntary civil commitment criteria, some forensic 
mental health professionals answered by suggesting that such legal mandates could 
comfortably be ignored68 where they conflicted with the witness' "moral judgment," 
Where they were "tyrannical," or where .they would lead to a too "literal" interpre-
tation of the law. 69 Dr William McCormick, for instance, has quoted an anonymous 
60 
Diamond, The Fallacy of che Impartial Experc, 3 .ARCHIVES CRIM. PSYCHODYNAMICS 221, 222 (1959), 
as quoced in Goldstein, Hiring che Hired Guns: Lawyers and Their Psychiatric Expercs, 11 LEGAL Snm. 
~ORUM 41 (1987); see also M. Perlin, supra note 34, manuscript at 13. . . . 
See, e.g., Homant & Kennedy, Judgment of Legal Insanity as a Function of Acutude Toward che Insanity 
[?efense, 8 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 67 (1985). . . . . 
Zusman & Simon, Differences in Repeaceq, Psychiatric Examinations of Lmgancs co a Lawsuic, 140 AM. 
l, PSYCHIATRY 1300, 1302-04 (1983) . 
Davis, Law, Science and History: Reflections Upon In The Best Interests of the Child., 86 MICH. L. 
Riiv. 1096, 1107 (1988), citing s. GouLD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 21-22 (1981). 
64 
Physician Biases Found co Affecc Decision co Maintain Pau·ent Confidentiality, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Oct. 
5, 1990, at 17 (research sample included 200 family practitioners, internists, obstetricians/gynecologists 
~nd general practitioners residing in Tennessee). 
~ogers, Turner, Helfield & Dickens, Forensic Psychiatrists' and Psychologiscs ' Understanding of Insantiy: 
~isguided Expertise, 33 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 691 (1988). 
67 Halleck, supra note 45, at 281. 
Dalton & Foreman, Confiiccs of Inceresc Associated wich che Psychiatric Hospicalization of Children 57 
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 12, 13 (1987);· see generally Schlesinger & Dorwart, Ownership and M;ntal 
[!ealch Services, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 959 (1984) . 
This is not to suggest that all evaluators responded in this way. Compare Lidz, Mulvey, Appelbaum 
& Cleveland, Commitment.· The Consistency of Clinicians and che Use of Legal Standards, 146 AM. J. PsY-
~~TRY 176 (1989) (in one carefully controlled test, clinicians did conform to the prevailing involuntary 
~Vt! commitment law) . 
See Chodoff, Involuntary Hospicalization of che Mencally Ill as a Moral Issue, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
384, 388 (1984); Chodoff, The Case for Involuntary Hospitalization of che Mentally Ill, 133 AM. J. PsY-
~IIIATRy 496, 501 (1976); Lamb, lnvoluncary Tre_atment for the !fomeless_ Mentally Ill, 4 NOTRE DAME 
· ~ -. ETHics & PuB. PoL'Y 269, 277 (1989) . Studies demonstrating that involuntary civil commitment 
decis1onmaking "may not rest on statutory grounds" are collected in Thompson & Ager, supra note 
44, at 120. 
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(but apparently knowledgeable) medical colleague who reported, following amend-
ments to Ontario's Mental Health Act, "Doctors will continue to certify those whom 
they really believe should be certified. They will merely learn a new language."70 
It was, in part, attitudes such as these that had led Michael Saks to refer to such 
witnesses as "imperial experts" who install themselves as "temporary monarchs" 
by replacing a "societal preference" expressed "through the law and legal process 
with [their] own preferences."71 The same question surfaces similarly in a more 
benign setting: Paul Appelbaum has noted how, given the "extremely nebulous" 
standards set out in Social Security or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) disability 
law, there is "strong temptation" for sympathetic evaluators to call a patient disabled 
"even if that requires 'twisting the rules of justice and faimess."'72 It should be 
no surprise that such attitudes will likely lead to even more disproportionate forensic 
imbalances. 
These imbalances tum up in a variety of dual loyalty institutional settings. In 
some cases, the "competitor" may be a mental health agency, an arm of state govern-
ment, a private corporation, or a judicial agency. In each instance, the focus of 
the competing institutional loyalty is slightly different, but the same questions need 
to be asked: 
Are clinicians unduly biased by agency? Do forensic experts engage in either 
self-deception and/or conscious misrepresentation regarding whom they see 
as the client? Does agency necessarily compromise objectivity?73 
While some prominent and thoughtful mental health professionals have responded 
nobly to the presence of this dilemma, 74 this issue appears to be "off the table" 
for the purposes of most considerations of the forensic mental health system. 
Finally, it should be intuitive that the tensions in these cases are increased once 
the underlying matter actually reaches the courtroom. And yet, we have paid scant 
attention to another important question: how do the courts feel about all of this? 
Typically, they fluctuate radically from positions of total disinterest to extreme pre-
occupation. 75 However, if we consider the path of U.S. Supreme Court litigation 
over the past seven years-from Barefoot v. Estelle (allowing a non-examining forensic 
'
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McCormick, Involuntary Commitment in Ontario: Some Barriers to the Provision of Proper Care, 124 
CAN. MED. A.J. 715, 717 (1981) (emphasis added). 
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Saks, Expert Witnesses, Nonexpert Witnesses, and Nonwitness Experts, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 291,294 
& n .2 (1990) . See alsoM. Perlin, supra note 34, at 14-18. 
72 Appelbaum, supra note 57, at 228. 
73 Rogers, supra note 40, at 150. See also Anderten, Staulcup & Grisso, On Being Ethical in Legal Places, 
11 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY 764 (1980). 
74 
See, e.g., J. ROBITSCHER, supra note 29; J. ROBITSCHER, PuRsUIT OF AGREEMENT: PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 
(1966); S. HALLECK, supra note 30; Halleck supra note 45; B. BURSTEN, supra note 51; J. Monahan, 
supra note 39; Rogers, supra note 40; Appelbaum, supra note 32; Appelbaum, supra note 57; Sadoff, 
Practical Ethical Problems of the Forensic Psychiatrist in Dealing with Attorneys, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSY-
CHIATRY & L. 243 (1984); Weinstock, Perceptions of Ethical Problems by Forensic Psychiatrists, 17 BULL. 
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 189 (1989); Weinstock, Controversial Ethical Issues in Forensic Psychiatry: 
A Survey, 33 J. FORENSIC SCI. 176 (1988): Weinstock, Ethical Concerns Expressed by Forensic Psychiatrists, 
31 J. FORENSIC SCI. 596 (1986). For a recent behavioral inquiry, see Hollien, The Expert Witness: Ethics 
and Responsibilities, 35J. FORENSIC SCI. 1414 (1990). 
"See Perlin, The Supreme Court, The Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, and Symbolic Values: Random 
Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or "Doctrinal Abyss"? 29 ARiz. L . REV. 1, 3 (1987) ("Llke the moth to 
the flame, the [Supreme] Court remains irresistibly drawn to . . . cases [involving mentally disabled 
defendants and forensic testimony], espeically when they arise in the capital punishment setting.") ( empha-
sis in original). 
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expert to testify as to future dangerousness in a death penalty case on the basis 
of hypotheticals)76 through the competency for execution cases77 to the recent 
decision in Washington v. Harper (sharply limiting the right of a prisoner to refuse 
the imposition of unwanted psychotropic medications) 78-we find that, notwith-
standing some expressions of concern by several justices (usually in dissent),79 the 
Supreme Court, institutionally, is profoundly underwhelmed by these imbalances, 
the resulting conflicts and the potential for serious exploitation ofpower.80 
This should not come as a major surprise. The Supreme Court's decisionmaking 
in the relevant areas has developed largely "out of consciousness," and the Court 
has regularly rejected all levels of psychodynamic explanation for personal behavior. 81 
In the course of his opinions, the Chief Justice has consistently revealed his discomfort 
in having to deal with questions involving mental disability, especially when they 
arise in forensic settings.82 Myths and meta-myths saturate the relevant judicial opi-
nions. 83 In short, we cannot look to the Supreme Court, as currently constituted, 
to grant us much relief from the social dilemmas about which I have been speaking. 
III. THERAPEUTIC RELATIONSHIPS 
The public issues often at the center of the forensic relationship power struggle--the 
publicized insanity acquittal, the death penalty dangerousness hearing, and the oper-
ational impact of the implementation of the right to refuse treatment on an institu-
tionalized population-are largely missing in the therapeutic relationship. It is thus 
perhaps easier to gloss over the underlying power imbalances that we still must 
reconcile in the traditional, dyadic relationship between the mental health pro-
fessional and her client. For that reason, it may thus be even more important that 
We pay special attention to the subject. 
In his monumental work, The Powers of Psychiatry, Jonas Robitscher was clear 
in his critique of the alleged neutrality or value-freedom of the therapeutic relation-
ship. A whole "constellation of values-personal, economic, political, philosophical, 
;: 463 U.S. 880, 903-04 (1983) . 
See supra note 54. 
7
~ Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1037-42 (1990) (state administrative rule adequately protected 
n~t ~o refuse of convicted prisoner); compare id. at 1052 (S~evens, J., d_issenting) (sharply critiquing 
m_aJonty opinion for inappropriately blending state interests m "_convenience prison administration" 
With individual's therapeutic need for medication); see 2 M . Perhn, supra note 54, §5.64A, at 33-42 
~1990 pocket part). 
80 
S ee generally Perlin supra note 75, at 81- 87 . 
But see Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975, 986-90 (1990) (reflecting Supreme Court willingness 
~o consider underlying issues in context of voluntary civil commitment admissions process). 
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~erlin, supra note 75, at 98 (discussing Supreme Court's reading of cases involving mentally disabled 
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Pr_of~ssionals and the mental health professions through the filter of cases involving mentally disabled 
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Id. at 713- 30; Perlin, supra note 75, at 82- 83. S ee, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U .S. 68, 83 (1985) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (right ofindigent criminal defendant to psychiatric assistance to present insanity 
defense); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.~. 284, 2?7 (I 986) _(Rehnquist,~-• concurring) (disallowing 
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f;!1randa waiver absent police misconduct). 
Perlin, supra note 52, at 706-11 (d:scussing myths) . 
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therapeutic-determines the treatment relationship,"84 Robitscher wrote, and it 
is "foolish" for mental health professionals to claim that their disciplines are "objec-
tive and value free": 
The purpose of the therapeutic encounter is to permit one person to have 
enough effect on another person to change behavior and personality, and such 
a situation is rife with values. . .. The values that psychiatrists provide for 
their patients and for society are the most influential expressions of the great 
authority that psychiatry exerts. 85 
Seymour Halleck saw the power issue even more specifically, arguing that, by 
participating in individual psychotherapy, a patient "regularly experiences either 
a gain or a loss of power in relation to his family or friends, " 86 and that the "vectors" 
in the therapy encounter that favor conformity "tend to be the most powerful. " 87 
Here, Halleck and Robitscher were engaging primarily in a social critique rather 
than a legal one (although they both acknowledged the degree to which behavioral 
decisions by mental health professionals led to legal outcomes and implicated legal 
standards).88 But their concerns still help inform the way we must think about 
this topic. Issues of power permeate the therapeutic relationship, albeit in more 
subtle ways than they infect the forensic relationship. The fact that the therapeutic 
relationship takes place regularly hidden from public view (in direct opposition to 
the media saturation that sometimes accompanies forensic decision making) 89 
should not obscure this fact. 
Because the therapeutic relationship is a private one, and because therapy generally 
takes place behind closed doors, the rest of society remains somewhat in the dark 
as to what actually goes on, and as to what impact the underlying power imbalances 
have over what transpires. For better or worse, one major source of data is that 
of the reported caselaw: litigation is what happens, at least sometimes, when the 
therapeutic relationship is perceived as severely infected. 
If we try to turn to this as our database, we must begin by confronting an important 
empirical reality. Notwithstanding the general perception of a "litigation explosion" 
(a perception that is deeply flawed on a variety of important levels),90 the reality 
is that the incidence of civil malpractice suits against mental health professionals 
remains substantially lower than rates for other medical specialities,91 a variance 
84 J. RoBITSCHER, supra note 29, at 399. 
85 Id. at 400. 
86 S. HALLECK, supra note 30, at 33. 
87 Id. at 33-34. 
88 See, e.g., S. HALLECK, supra note 30, at 139-46;J. ROBITSCHER, supra note 29, at401-05;J. ROBITSCHER, 
supra note 74, at 16-34. 
89 On the impact of the media on the shaping of insanity defense jurisprudence, see Perlin, supra note 
52, at 617 n.76, 621-22 n.101, and sources cited therein. 
9° Compare Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567 (1975); Manning, Hyperlexis: Our 
National Disease, 71 Nw. U. L. REv. 767 (1977) (setting out myths), to Galanter, Reading the Landscape 
of Disputes: What We Know (And Think We Know) Ab.out Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 
31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 38-39 (1983); Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: 
Naming, Blaming, Claiming . .. , 15 LAW & Soc'y REV. 631, 652 (1984); Rottman, Tort Litigation in 
the State Courts: Evidence from the Trial Court Information Network, 14 STATE CT. J. 4 (Fall 1990) (setting 
out reality). 
91 See M. PERLIN, supra note 54, §12.02, at 3-4, citing Slawson, The Clinical Dimension of Psychiatric 
Malpractice, 14 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 358,363 (1984); see also, Slawson Psychiatric Malpractice: A State-
wide Survey, 6 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 58 (-1978). 
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that is reflected in the comparatively "minuscule" insurance rate increases in the 
mental health professions (as compared to other branches of health care). 92 
Many reasons have been offered to explain this low rate. Speculations have focused 
on the general reluctance of the tort law to provide remedies for emotional injuries, 
the difficulty in proving the applicable standard of care and the existence of a causal 
relationship between the breach of the standard and the alleged injury, the stigma 
that patients fear might result from making public their psychiatric history, the reluc-
tance to sue as a result of a patient's emotional tie to the mental health professional 
and/or the patient's feeling that psychotherapy could not succeed without the thera-
pist's full cooperation, the inability on the part of many patients either to formulate 
clear expectations for the result of their treatment or to assess the "success" of 
their results, the ability of trained mental health professionals to deal therapeutically 
With patient hostility and thus avoid suit, the frequency with which many patients 
see mental health professionals, and the fact that psychiatry and psychology remain 
somewhat enigmatic to a significant percentage of the trial bar. 93 
We are now learning some important data, as to why some patients choose to 
sue over the "violation of expectations"94 that leads to malpractice litigation. Recent 
empirical studies suggest that the decision to file suit is related positively to patient 
assertiveness, to the patient's ability to engage in strategic formulations, and to 
the involvement and discernment of a "broad audience network" (actors external 
to the relationship between dissatisfied patients and doctors), and is related negatively 
to such factors as the patient's evaluation (prior to the precipitating grievance) of 
the doctor's competence, to the doctor's show of concern for the patient's "state 
in life," and, interestingly, to the patient's degree of knowledge about the work 
ofboth health and legal professionals (i.e., those with greater knowledge about either, 
sue less). 95 
In addition, there is now some significant external evidence that this "most favored 
nation"96 status is now changing. In recent years, the law has become generally 
more receptive to allegations of emotional injury, ex-patients have openly and can-
didly discussed their treatment experiences (thus perhaps lessening the stigma of 
treatment for others), the "explosion" in litigation on behalf of the institutionalized 
mentally disabled has sensitized judges and litigators to some of the underlying 
substantive issues, and more has been learned about what happens empirically when 
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certain treatments are employed. 97 Yet, many of the explanations of the still-lower 
relative rate of litigation can still be traced to the power imbalances inherent in 
the therapeutic relationship: the stigma resulting from publicizing a "failed" therapy 
encounter, impact of the transference phenomenon on reluctance to sue, feelings 
of patient-generated self-blame for therapy "failures," and the skill with which many 
mental health professionals can sidestep hostility by deftly shifting the focus of thera-
peutic encounters. 98 · 
Still as we know, important cases involving therapeutic relationships have been 
litigated. It is also likely that the public's use of the availability heuristic99 signifi-
cantly inflates perceptions of both the frequency and the precedential impact of 
such cases. For both empirical and instrumental reasons, then, it is important that 
we look at some of these areas of litigation in an effort to evaluate the extent to 
which they are permeated by power imbalance issues. I want thus to consider briefly 
three specific problems that may stem from the sort of boundary violation100 that 
accompanies power imbalance: litigation based on improper treatment (including 
drug reactions), 101 litigation based on improper sexual conduct and/or attempts to 
financially manipulate clients, 102 and litigation that arises from perceived violations 
of confidentiality, especially with regard to the type of "third party" protection or 
warning that was present in the Tarsoff case. 103 
First, it should be intuitive that the improper administration of medication is 
a 'potential minefield.' 104 Beyond the problems posed by neurological side-effects 
such as tardive dyskinesia, 105 liability issues can arise in a variety of medication-
related settings: 
[A]bsence of an adequate history, physical examination, and laboratory examin-
ation prior to treatment, prescription of a drug where it is not indicated, pre-
scription of the wrong dosage, prescription of medication for inappropriately 
short or long time periods, failure to recognize, monitor or treat side-effects 
97 3M. PERLIN, supra note 54, §12 .02, at 6-7; see also B. FURROW, MALPRACTICE IN PSYCHIATRY (1980); 
Wettstein & Appelbaum, Legal Liability for Tardive Dyskinesia, 35 HOSP. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 992 
(1984); Wettstein, Psychiatry and the Law, in TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1059 (J. Talbott, R. Hales 
& S. Yudofsky eds. 1988); Wettstein, Psychiatric Malpractice, in 8 REVIEW OF PSYCHIATRY 392 (A. Tasman, 
R. Hales & A. Frances eds. 1989). 
98 
On the correlative question of the duties that can be imposed on patients in the context of therapeutic 
relationships, see Beahrs, Legal Duties of Psychiatric Patients, 18 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 
189 (1990). 
99 For example, concrete and vivid information about a specific case overwhelms the abstract data upon 
which rational choices are usually made. see Rosenhan, Psychological Realities and Judicial Policies, 10 
STAN. LAW. 10, 13- 14 (1984); Perlin, supra note 34, at 987 n. 197; see generally Perlin, Psychodynamics 
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100 The boundaries of patient-therapist relationships are discussed in 1 THE TECHNIQUES OF PSYCHO· 
ANALYTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 206-208, 581 (R. D. Langs ed. 1973). 
10 1 See, e.g., Wettstein, Tardive Dyskinesia and Malpractice, 1 BEHAVIORAL Ser. & L. 85 (1983). 
102 See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 22. 
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or toxicity failure to abate the possibility of drug reactions or interactions, 
and failure to consult with the necessary experts. 106 
While there still have been few decisions in this area, 101 the scant litigation that 
has been reported reflects some of the issues inherent in power imbalances. For 
example, there have been instances of doctors who prescribed a 50-day supply of 
Valium without taking a medical history or checking the patient's medical records, 108 
Who failed to change a prescription following his observation of side-effects and 
the onset of self-destructive behavior on the part of the patient, 109 or who prescribed 
addictive drugs so as to help the patient see the nature of his addictive personality. 110 
It is not clear whether the therapists' actions stemmed simply from sloppy medical 
Practice ("negligence" in the true sense of the word), whether they resulted from 
a failure to take patients' individual needs into account, or something else. 
When one reads some of the cases in this area carefully, one can almost discern 
~ Pattern: the defendant-perhaps employing "typification"111-"slots" his patients 
into certain categories, and prescribes a similar regimen for all. 112 Such a pattern 
reflects precisely the kind of power imbalance that Robitscher and Halleck warned 
about. 113 
Second, the sexual misconduct cases114 are probably the most pernicious since 
CI) while there is no question that such behavior by a therapist is "always unethi-
~al, " 115 (2) surveys suggest that between I 0% and 17% of therapists have engaged 
1n such behavior with their clients, 116 and (3) the fact settings by their very nature 
reflect a severe power imbalance. 117 Three cases have been well publicized in this 
regard. In Roy v. Hartogs, 118 the court upheld a damage award to a patient whose 
Psychiatrist engaged in sexual intercourse with her, claiming that it was a legitimate 
Pan of therapy; in Zipkin v. Freeman, 119 an award was upheld when the therapist 
Persuaded his patient to swim with him in the nude, leave her husband, and invest 
her money in business ventures that he controlled; in Landau v. Werner, 120 a verdict 
Was similarly affirmed when a therapist, after explaining the transference phenome-
10, 
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non121 to a patient who had told him she had fallen in love with him, began to 
date the patient and discussed the possibility of vacationing together. 
In all of these instances-as well as others less notorious122-the patient remains 
vulnerable to and susceptible to the influence and suggestion of the therapist. 123 
As time continues, as revelations of similar improper sexual contacts increase, and 
as we confront the reality that the vast majority of therapists self-report a feeling 
of sexual attraction to'their clients, 124 we can expect a proliferation of"sexual miscon-
duct" litigation. In virtually every instance, the power imbalances inherent in the 
therapeutic relationship will be at the core of the litigation. 
Finally, the confidentiality cases must be seen through two different prisms: those 
cases that arise from a breach of a mental health professional's failure to maintain 
secrecy regarding a disclosure made to him directly by a patient (about the patient 
herself), 125 and those that stem from an inquiry into the professional's duty to protect . 
others as a result of information given by the patient in which there is a question 
as to whether or not a third party might be in danger, the so-called Tarasoff excep-
tion.126 
The first grouping of cases implicate statutory rights (in those jurisdictions where 
there is an operative psychotherapist-patient privilege), 127 contractual rights128 and 
constitutional rights (where the right to privacy is given such content). 129 The right 
to confidentiality, of course, is not absolute. In addition to the Tarasoff cases (where 
there is a judicially or legislatively imposed duty to warn or protect a third party 
of potential danger), 130 there are exceptions inherent in the forensic relationship, 131 
in cases where the patient puts his mental state in issue affirmatively in litigation, 132 
and in cases where there is a conflict between confidentiality and a police power 
121 See Decker v. Fink, 47 Md. App. 202, 422 A.2d 389, 391 (1980): 
Inherent in the transference neurosis is the development of a strong dependence by the patient 
upon the analyst and an extraordinary faith and trust in him which may develop into a love 
relationship and which can deprive the patient of her independent judgment and ability to dis-
tinguish the reality of her interaction with the analyst and vice versa. 
The "transference neurosis" is explained and discussed in R. BALSAM & A. BALSAM, BECOMING A 
PSYCHOTHERAPIST: A CLINICAL PRIMER 64-73 (1974). 
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300 S.E.2d 833 (1983); Andrews v. United States, 732 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1984); Matter of Schroeder, 
415 N.W.2d 436 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev. den., (Jan. 23, 1988); Block v. Ambach, 140 A.D.2d 814, 
528 N .Y.S.2d 204 (1988), aff'd, 73 N.Y.2d 323,537 N.E.2d 1181, 540 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1989). 
123 
Decker, 422 A.2d at 391 . See also Note, Patient-Therapist S exual Relations: Professional Services Rendered? 
A Case CommentonDoev. Swift, 14 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REv. 87 (1990) . 
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Power imbalances 127 
statute (such as one governing civil commitment or child abuse reporting). 133 
Nevertheless, the policy's rationale rests finally on a power issue: disclosure of confi-
dential communications might well "deter persons from seeking needed assistance, 
or from making the full disclosure on which diagnosis and treatment depends. " 134 
The Tarasoff paradigm actually more closely parallels the issues raised in consider-
ing forensic relationships. Since courts and legislatures have carved out a confidentia-
!ity exception, the question remains: how will therapists respond to the externally 
imposed duty to breach confidentiality? A variety of sensitive solutions has been 
suggested. Loren Roth and Alan Meisel, for instance, have listed five guidelines 
to govern Tarasoff situations: (1) prudence to avoid being "stampeded" into giving 
unnecessary warnings; (2) provision of information as to the limits of confidentiality 
Prior to the entry into the therapeutic relationship; (3) the use of various "social 
and environmental manipulations" prior to being forced to compromise confidenti-
ality (such as bringing third parties into the therapeutic setting); ( 4) obtaining 
Patients' permission (wherever possible) prior to disclosure of confidential infor-
mation, and disclosing such information in the patient's presence; and (5) assessing 
any such intervention in light of its potential impact on future therapy and in light 
of the likelihood that it will be successful in preventing future violence. 135 Again, 
these suggestions implicitly reflect the problems raised by power imbalances in the 
therapeutic/forensic relationship. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I-laving said this, it is necessary to also acknowledge some extraordinarily important 
additional truths: · 
. -Courts are suspicious of and generally reject psychodynamic explanations of 
interpersonal behavior, as being inherently dissonant with the "free will" basis of 
the criminal justice and tort systems. 136 · 
-Much legal decisionmaking can best be explained by (1) a study of the types 
of simplifying heuristics that frequently lead to distorted and systematically erroneous 
decisions through ignoring or misusing of rationally useful information, 137 and (2) 
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an examination of the way that "ordinary common sense" unconsciously animates 
decisionmakers. 138 
-Judges are profoundly teleological in their use of social science and behavioral 
evidence in their decisionmaking, a factor that tends to further debase and trivialize 
scientific research, data and discourse. 139 
-Jurors are overwhelmingly ambivalent about all of the underlying concepts: 
the role of mental health expert testimony in the court process, mental disability 
as an animating explanation for behavior, the efficacy of therapy, the proper balance 
that must be struck between professional autonomy, public safety and privacy, and 
jurors' decisionmaking similarly reflects the use of heuristic reasoning devices and 
"ordinary common sense. " 140 
-As a result of these conflicts and ambivalences, legal decisionmakers, like the 
rest of us, exhibit cognitive dissonance (the reinterpretation of information and exper-
ience that conflicts with their internally accepted or publicly stated beliefs so as 
to avoid the unpleasant state that such inconsistencies produce) 141 in the way they 
deal with the substantive issues under consideration. 
These final thoughts are not meant to be nihilistic, but to simply accentuate the 
difficulty · of resolving the underlying issues. We must consciously "unpack the 
myths" 142 and "strip the facade" 143 from the stereotypical ways that vivid, heuristic 
evidence is presented144-in legal forums, in mental health forums and in public 
forums-to consider the power imbalance issues that underlie each of these relation-
ships. This must be done consciously and openly ifwe are to illuminate-and attempt 
to resolve-the core questions that concern us. 
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